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Abstract
Security of linear ramp secret sharing schemes can be characterized
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28]. In this paper we elaborate on the implication of these parameters
and we devise a method to estimate their value for general one-point
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1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method to encode a secret into
multiple shares later distributed to participants, so that only specified sets
of participants can reconstruct the secret. The first secret sharing scheme
was proposed by Shamir [39]. It was a perfect scheme, in which a set of par-
ticipants unable to reconstruct the secret has absolutely no information on
the secret. Later, non-perfect secret sharing schemes were proposed [4, 46]
in which there are sets of participants that have non-zero amount of infor-
mation about the secret but cannot reconstruct it. The term ramp secret
sharing scheme is sometimes used for the latter mentioned type of schemes,
sometimes for the union of the two types. In this paper we will apply the
most general definition, but concentrate our investigation on non-perfect se-
cret sharing schemes. Secret sharing has been used, for example, to store
confidential information to multiple locations geographically apart. By using
secret sharing schemes in such a scenario, the likelihoods of both data loss
and data theft are decreased. As far as we know, in many applications both
perfect and non-perfect ramp secret sharing schemes can be used. In the
perfect scheme, the size of a share must be at least that of the secret [5]. On
the other hand, ramp secret sharing schemes allow shares to be smaller than
the secret, which is what we concentrate on in this paper. Such schemes are
particularly useful for storing bulk data [7]
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be described as a coset construc-
tion C1/C2 where C2 ( C1 are linear codes [6] . It was shown in [2, 28, 41]
that the corresponding relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) expresses
the worst case information leakage to unauthorized sets in such a system.
RDLP was proposed by Luo et al. [30]. They [30] also proposed the relative
generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) and its equivalence to RDLP, similar
to the one demonstrated by Forney [13] between the dimension/length pro-
file and the generalized Hamming weight. The m-th RGHW expresses the
smallest size of unauthorized sets that can obtain m q-bits [2, 28], where q is
the size of the alphabet of C2 ( C1. In order to investigate the potential of
linear codes to construct useful ramp secret sharing schemes, it is indispens-
able to study the RGHW and the RDLP. However, not much research has
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been done so far, partly because the connection between the secret sharing
and RGHW/RDLP was only recently reported. In particular, few classes of
linear codes have been examined for their RGHW/RDLP. In this paper we
study RGHW of general linear codes by the Feng-Rao approach [17], and ex-
plore its consequences for one-point algebraic geometry (AG) codes [43, 22]
and in particular the Hermitian codes [42, 40, 47].
The present paper starts with a discussion of known results regarding
linear ramp secret sharing schemes and it continues with demonstrating that
the RGHWs can also be used to express the best case information leakage.
The main result of the paper is a method to estimate RGHW of one-point
algebraic geometric codes. This is done by carefully applying the Feng-Rao
bounds [17] for primary [1] as well as dual [11, 12, 37, 22, 32, 21] codes.
From this we derive a relatively simple bound which uses information on
the corresponding Weierstrass semigroup [24, 8]. As shall be demonstrated
for Hermitian codes the new bound is often sharp. Moreover, for the same
codes the RGHW are often much larger than the corresponding generalized
Hamming weights (GHW) [44] which means that studies of RGHW cannot
be substituted by those of GHW.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the use of RGHW in
connection with linear ramp secret sharing schemes, and in connection with
communication over the wiretap channel of type II. In Section 3 we apply the
theory to the special case of MDS codes. In Section 4 we show – at the level
of general linear codes – how to employ the Feng-Rao bounds to estimate
RGHW. This method is then applied to one-point algebraic geometric codes
in Section 5. We investigate Hermitian codes in Section 6, and treat the
corresponding ramp secret sharing schemes in Section 7.
2 Ramp secret sharing schemes and wiretap
channels of type II
Ramp secret sharing schemes were introduced in [4, 46]. Let Fq be the finite
field with q elements. A ramp secret sharing scheme with t-privacy and r-
reconstruction is an algorithm that, given an input ~s ∈ Fℓq, outputs a vector
~x ∈ Fnq , the vector of shares that we want to share among n players, such
that, given a collection of shares {xi | i ∈ I} where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, one has
no information about ~s if #I ≤ t and one can recover ~s if #I ≥ r [6]. We
shall always assume that t is largest possible and that r is smallest possible
such that the above hold. We say that one has a t-threshold secret sharing
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scheme if t = r + 1.
We consider the secret sharing schemes introduced in [6, Section 4.2],
which was the first general construction of ramp secret sharing schemes using
arbitrary linear codes: Let C2 ( C1 ⊆ Fnq be two linear codes. Set k2 =
dim(C2) and k1 = dim(C1) and let L ( Fnq be such that C1 = L⊕C2 (direct
sum). That is, L∩C2 = {~0} and the union of a basis for L and a basis for C2
constitutes a basis for C1. We denote by ℓ = dim(L) = dim(C1/C2) = k1−k2.
We consider a secret ~s ∈ Fℓq; note that ℓ > 0 since C1 6= C2. We fix
a vector space isomorphism ψ : Fℓq → L which maps the secret ~s ∈ F
ℓ
q to
L, and choose ~c2 ∈ C2 randomly (uniformly distributed). Finally, consider
~x = ψ(~s) + ~c2 ∈ C1. The n shares consist of the n coordinates of ~x; this
scheme is clearly Fq-linear [6]. One may also consider that the secret ~s is
represented by the coset ψ(~s)+C2 in C1/C2. Note that there are qℓ different
cosets in C1/C2 and there are qk2 possible representatives for every coset,
i.e. for generating the shares of a secret ~s. The schemes in [9, 31] form a
particular case of the above scheme with ℓ = 1.
Remark 1. All linear ramp secret sharing schemes with shares in Fq are of
the above type. For constructions that use puncturing [31], [6, Sec. 4.1] we
can take C1, C2 to be the punctured codes.
Let I ⊆ J = {1, . . . , n}. We consider that an unauthorized set of partic-
ipants obtains the shares {xi | i ∈ I}. We represent the shares by a random
variable ~X, and the shares obtained by an unauthorized set of participants
by fI(~x) = (xi | i ∈ I) where fI : Fnq → F
#I
q . The amount of information
in q-bits that the unauthorized set obtains is measured by I(~S; fI( ~X)), the
mutual information, where ~S is the random variable that represents the se-
crets, and fI( ~X) is the random variable that represents the shares that an
unauthorized set may obtain. We assume that both ~S and ~X are uniformly
distributed. In particular we have t-privacy and r-reconstruction if t is largest
possible and r is smallest possible such that I(~S; fI( ~X)) = 0 for all #I ≤ t
and I(~S; fI( ~X)) = ℓ for all #I ≥ r. A (non sharp) bound for r and t was
given in [6]: r < n−d(C1) and t > d(C⊥2 ) where d(Ci) denotes the minimum
distance of Ci, for i = 1, 2. The exact values can be derived from [28, Proof
of Theorem 4] as
I(~S; fI( ~X)) = ℓ− dim((VI ∩ C1)/(VI ∩ C2)), (1)
= dim((C⊥2 ∩ VI)/(C
⊥
1 ∩ VI)), (2)
where I = J \ I and VI = {~x ∈ Fnq | xi = 0 for all i /∈ I}.
For the convenience of the reader we include the computation of the
previous mutual information: since the variables ~S and ~X are uniformly
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distributed one has that Hq(fI( ~X)) = logq #fI(C1) = dim(fI(C1)) = k1 −
dim(ker(fI) ∩ C1), and Hq(fI( ~X)|S) = logq #fI(C2) = dim(fI(C2)) = k2 −
dim(ker(fI) ∩ C2). Here, Hq is the entropy function to base q. Therefore
I(~S; fI( ~X)) = k1−k2−
(
dim(ker(fI)∩C1)−dim(ker(fI)∩C2)
)
and we obtain
equation (1). Equation (2) follows from (1) and an extension of Forney’s
second duality lemma [27, Lemma 25]: Let V ⊆ Fnq , then
dim((C⊥2 ∩ V
⊥)/(C⊥1 ∩ V
⊥)) = dim(C1/C2)− dim((C1 ∩ V )/(C2 ∩ V )).
In order to characterize the security of secret sharing schemes, one consid-
ers the jth relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) of two codes C2 ( C1
with j ∈ {1, . . . , n} [30]:
Kj(C1, C2) = max
I⊆J ,#I=j
dim((C1 ∩ VI)/(C2 ∩ VI)),
and themth relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) withm ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
[30]:
Mm(C1, C2) = min
I⊆J
{#I | dim((C1 ∩ VI)/(C2 ∩ VI)) = m}. (3)
In this way the worst amount of information leakage of ~s from j shares
is precisely characterized by the jth relative dimension/length profile of C⊥2
and C⊥1 [28, Theorem 4]:
max
I⊆J ,#I=j
I(~S; fI( ~X)) = max
I⊆J ,#I=j
dim((C⊥2 ∩ VI)/(C
⊥
1 ∩ VI)) = Kj(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ).
The smallest possible number of shares for which an unauthorized set of
participants can determine m q-bits of information is
min
I⊆J
{#I | I(~S; fI( ~X)) = m} = min
I⊆J
{#I | dim((C⊥2 ∩ VI)/(C
⊥
1 ∩ VI)) = m}
= Mm(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ).
In particular t = M1(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1 [28, Theorem 9]. (See also [2, Th. 6.7] and
for the special case of ℓ = 1 [9, Cor. 1.7]). We now generalize the notion of
t-privacy and r-reconstruction.
Definition 2. We say that a ramp secret sharing scheme has (t1, . . . , tℓ)-
privacy and (r1, . . . , rℓ)-reconstruction if t1, . . . , tℓ are chosen largest possible
and r1, . . . , rℓ are chosen smallest possible such that:
• an adversary cannot obtain m q-bits of information about ~s with any
tm shares,
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• it is possible to recover m q-bits of information about ~s with any col-
lection of rm shares.
In particular, one has t = t1 and r = rℓ.
By our previous discussion one has that tm = Mm(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 ) − 1 since
Mm(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) is the smallest size of a set of shares that can determine m
q-bits of information about ~s [28, Theorem 4]. We will show that (r1, . . . , rℓ)
can be characterized in terms of the RGHWs as well. Let r′m be the largest
size of a set of shares that cannot determine m q-bits of information about
~s, i.e.
r′m = max
I⊆J
{#I | I(~S; f( ~X)) < m}. (4)
This value is closely related to rm since any strictly larger set of shares
will determine m q-bits of information about ~s and thus
rm = r
′
m + 1
= max
I⊆J
{#I | I(~S; fI( ~X)) < m}+ 1
= max
I⊆J
{#I | I(~S; fI( ~X)) = m− 1}+ 1
= max
I⊆J
{#I | dim((C1 ∩ VI)/(C2 ∩ VI)) = ℓ−m+ 1}+ 1, by (1)
= n−min
I⊆J
{#I | dim((C1 ∩ VI)/(C2 ∩ VI)) = ℓ−m+ 1}+ 1
= n−Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1. (5)
In particular one has that r = rℓ = n−M1(C1, C2) + 1 [28, Theorem 9] (see
also [9, Cor. 1.7] for the special case ℓ = 1). We note that r′m corresponds to
the (m− 1)th conjugate relative length/dimension profile in [48].
Theorem 3. Let C1/C2, where dim(C1)−dim(C2) = ℓ, be a linear ramp se-
cret sharing scheme with (t1, . . . , tℓ)-privacy and (r1, . . . , rℓ)-reconstruction.
Then for m = 1, . . . , ℓ we have tm = Mm(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) − 1 and rm = n −
Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1.
We shall relate the above concept of (t1, . . . , tℓ)-privacy and (r1, . . . , rℓ)-
reconstruction to the literature: let D1 ( D2 ⊆ Fnq be vector spaces of
codimension ℓ and define for 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ,
Am(D1, D2) = {I ⊆ J | m = dim(D1 ∩ VI)/(D2 ∩ VI)}.
Since I(~S; fI( ~X)) = dim((C⊥2 ∩ VI)/(C
⊥
1 ∩ VI)) we have that, for D1 = C
⊥
2
and D2 = C⊥1 , Am(D1, D2) is the collection of shares that give m q-bits of
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information about ~S. In addition, Aℓ(D1, D2) is the access structure in the
sense of [25], and Am(D1, D2) is equivalent to Am in [26, Eq. (3.1)].
In particular we are interested in the largest and smallest element of such
a collection of shares
Aminm (D1, D2) = {I ∈ Am(D1, D2) | ∄K ∈ Am(D1, D2) s.t. K ( I}
Amaxm (D1, D2) = {I ∈ Am(D1, D2) | ∄K ∈ Am(D1, D2) s.t. K ) I}
and, as we are interested in its size, we define
Adm(D1, D2) = {I ∈ Am(D1, D2) | d = #I}
Amin,dm (D1, D2) = {I ∈ A
min
m (D1, D2) | d = #I}
Amax,dm (D1, D2) = {I ∈ A
max
m (D1, D2) | d = #I}.
Moreover, we are interested in the smallest and the largest size of a col-
lection of shares that reveal m q-bits of information: the first one being the
smallest d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Amin,dm (D1, D2) is non-empty and it is equal
toMm(D1, D2) = tm+1. Analogously, the largest size of a collection of shares
that reveals m q-bits of information is the largest d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Amax,dm (D1, D2) is non-empty and it is equal to n−Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2)+1 = rm.
Ramp secret sharing schemes with ℓ > 1 are relevant in the situation
where the set of possible secrets is large but one wants to keep the size of
each share small. A further motivation for considering ℓ > 1 is the analogy
to the wiretap channels of type II [45, 36]. Recall that this model involves
a main channel from Alice to Bob which is assumed to be error and erasure
free, and a secondary channel from Alice to the eavesdropper Eve which is
a q-ary erasure channel. Consider the slightly more general situation where
also the main channel is a q-ary erasure channel [41]. Assuming that the
probability of erasure is much smaller on the main channel than on the sec-
ondary channel we see that to achieve reliable and secure communication we
should use long codes C2 ( C1. To retain a positive information rate on
the main channel we therefore need ℓ > 1. The exact values of the mutual
information on the main and the secondary channel could be calculated from
Am(D1, D2), m = 1, . . . , ℓ and the erasure probabilities of the two channels;
but it seems a difficult task to determine Am(D1, D2) even for simple codes.
Finding Mm(D1, D2) = tm + 1 and n −Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1 = rm, however,
would be a first step in this direction. As we shall see in the following, for
many codes we can easily estimate these last mentioned parameters.
In the remaining part of this paper we shall concentrate on methods to
estimate RGHW. We shall need the following definition which by [29] is
equivalent to (3) (see also [2, Def. 6.2]).
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Definition 4. Let C2 ( C1 be linear codes over Fq. Form = 1, . . . , dim(C1)−
dim(C2) the mth relative generalized Hamming weight is defined as
Mm(C1, C2)
= min{#SuppD | D is a subspace of C1, dim(D) = m,D ∩ C2 = {~0}}.
From this definition the connection between the RGHW and the gener-
alized Hamming weight (GHW) becomes clear – the latter being dm(C1) =
Mm(C1, C2) with C2 = {~0}. Before embarking with more general classes of
codes in the next section we discuss the parameters tm, rm in the case of MDS
codes.
3 Ramp schemes based on MDS codes
Let C be an MDS code of dimension k. Then C⊥ is also MDS and conse-
quently
dm(C) = n− k +m, m = 1, . . . , k (6)
dm(C
⊥) = k +m, m = 1, . . . , n− k (7)
which means that all generalized Hamming weights attain the Singleton
bound. Consider two MDS codes C2 ( C1 with dim(C1) = k1 and dim(C2) =
k2. By definition, Mm(C1, C2) ≥ dm(C1), m = 1, . . . , ℓ = k1 − k2. How-
ever, the Singleton bound for RGHW is identical to the Singleton bound for
GHW [30, Sec. IV] and therefore Mm(C1, C2) = dm(C1) and Mm(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 ) =
dm(C
⊥
2 ) [41]. Based on (6) and (7) one can show that
Mm(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) = n−Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1, (8)
and from Theorem 3 it now follows that if we base a ramp scheme on two MDS
codes then the size of a group uniquely determines how much information it
can reveal:
tm = rm − 1, tm+1 = tm + 1, t1 = k2, rℓ = k1.
When the number of participants is larger than two times the field size minus
1 then by [23, Cor. 7.4.4] C1 and C2 cannot be MDS – unless k1 = n− 1 and
k2 = 1 – and consequently we can no longer assume (8). What is obviously
needed is a method to estimate the left and the right side of (8) for codes of
any length. As shall be demonstrated in the following the Feng-Rao method
makes this possible.
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4 The Feng-Rao bounds for RGHW
The Feng-Rao bounds come in two versions: One for primary codes [1, 18, 17]
and one for dual codes [10, 11, 12, 37, 22, 32]. The most general formula-
tions deal with arbitrary linear codes, whereas more specialized formulations
– such as the order bounds – require that the code construction is supported
by certain types of algebraic structures. The bounds have been applied to
the minimum distance, the generalized Hamming weights – and for the case
of dual codes of co-dimension 1 – also the relative minimum distance [9]. It
is not difficult to extend the method for estimating GHW to a method for
estimating RGHW. In the following we give the details for primary codes in
the language of general linear codes. The details for dual codes are similar,
hence for these codes we shall give a more brief description.
We start by introducing some terminology that shall be used throughout the
section. Let B = {~b1, . . . ,~bn} be a fixed basis for Fnq as a vector space over
Fq and write J = {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 5. The function ρ¯ : Fnq → J ∪ {0} is given as follows. For
non-zero ~c we have ρ¯(~c) = i where i is the unique integer such that
~c ∈ Span{~b1, . . . ,~bi}\Span{~b1, . . . ,~bi−1}.
Here we used the convention that Span ∅ = {~0}. Finally, ρ¯(~0) = 0.
The component wise product of two vectors in Fnq plays a fundamental role
in our exposition. This product is given by
(α1, . . . , αn) ∗ (β1, . . . , βn) = (α1β1, . . . , αnβn).
Definition 6. An ordered pair (i, j) ∈ J × J is said to be one-way well-
behaving (OWB) if ρ¯(~bi′ ∗~bj) < ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) holds true for all i
′ ∈ J with i′ < i.
Definition 7. For i ∈ J define
Λi = {l ∈ J | ∃ j ∈ J such that (i, j) is OWB and ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) = l}.
As is easily seen – if D ⊆ Fnq is a vector space of dimension m then it
holds that #ρ¯
(
D\{~0}
)
= m. (Actually, any set {~d1, . . . , ~dm} ⊆ D\{~0} with
ρ¯(~d1) < · · · < ρ¯(~dm) constitutes a basis for D). The following result is a
slight modification of the material in [1].
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Proposition 8. Let D ⊆ Fnq be a vector space of dimension at least 1. The
support size of D satisfies
#Supp(D) ≥ # ∪i∈ρ¯(D\{~0}) Λi. (9)
Proof. Let l1 < · · · < lσ be the elements in ∪i∈ρ¯(D\{~0})Λi and let i1, . . . , iσ
and j1, . . . , jσ be such that for s = 1, . . . , σ it holds that:
• is ∈ ρ¯(D\{~0}),
• (is, js) is OWB and ρ¯(~bis ∗~bjs) = ls.
Choose ~d1, . . . ~dσ ∈ D with ρ¯(~ds) = is, s = 1, . . . , σ. Clearly ρ¯(~ds ∗~bjs) = ls
and therefore ~d1 ∗ ~bj1 , . . . , ~dσ ∗ ~bjσ are linearly independent. In conclusion
D ∗Fnq = {~d ∗~c | ~d ∈ D,~c ∈ F
n
q } is of dimension at least σ. The dimension of
D ∗ Fnq equals the size of the support of D and the proposition follows.
We now turn to RGHW. Observe that although C2 ( C1 implies ρ¯(C2) (
ρ¯(C1), it does not always hold that ~c ∈ C1\C2 implies ρ¯(~c) ∈ ρ¯(C1)\ρ¯(C2).
However, some observations can still be made.
Theorem 9. Consider linear codes C2 ( C1, dim(C1) = k1, dim(C2) =
k2. Let u be the smallest element in ρ¯(C1) that is not in ρ¯(C2). For m =
1, . . . , k1 − k2 we have
Mm(C1, C2) ≥ min
{
# ∪ms=1 Λis | u ≤ i1 < · · · < im,
i1, . . . , im ∈ ρ¯(C1\{~0})
}
.
Proof. If D is an m-dimensional subspace of C1 with D ∩ C2 = {~0} then we
can write ρ¯(D\{~0}) = {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ ρ¯(C1\{~0}) with u ≤ i1 < · · · < im. The
theorem now follows from Proposition 8.
Corollary 10. Consider a k1-dimensional code C1, say C1 = Span{~f1, . . . , ~fk1},
where without loss of generality we assume ρ¯(~f1) < · · · < ρ¯(~fk1). For k2 < k1
let C2 = Span{~f1, . . . , ~fk2}. We have
Mm(C1, C2) ≥ min
{
# ∪ms=1 Λis | i1 < · · · < im,
i1, . . . , im ∈ {ρ¯(~fk2+1), . . . , ρ¯(~fk1)}
}
. (10)
Next we treat dual codes.
Definition 11. For ~c ∈ Fnq \{~0} define M(~c) to be the smallest number i ∈ J
such that ~c ·~bi 6= 0. Here ~a ·~b means the usual inner product between ~a and
~b.
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It is clear that for an m-dimensional space D we have #M(D\{~0}) = m.
Also it is clear that if D ⊆ C⊥, where C is a linear code, then M(D\{~0}) ∩
ρ¯(C) = ∅.
Definition 12. For l ∈ J define
Vl = {i ∈ J | ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) = l for some ~bj ∈ B with (i, j) OWB}.
The following result is proved by slightly modifying the proof of [21, Prop.
3.12] and [20, Th. 5].
Proposition 13. Let D ⊆ Fnq be a space of dimension at least 1. We have
#Supp(D) ≥ # ∪l∈M(D\{~0}) Vl.
From the above discussion we derive
Theorem 14. Consider linear codes C2 ( C1. Let u be the largest element
in ρ¯(C1\{~0}). For m = 1, . . . , dim(C1)− dim(C2) = dim(C
⊥
2 )− dim(C
⊥
1 ) we
have
Mm(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) ≥ min{# ∪
m
s=1 Vis | 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ u,
i1, . . . , im /∈ ρ¯(C2)}. (11)
To apply Theorem 9, Corollary 10 and Theorem 14 we need information on
which pairs are OWB. This suggests the use of a supporting algebra. One
class of algebras that works well is the order domains [22, 35, 19]. In the
present paper we will concentrate on the most prominent example of order
domain codes – namely one-point algebraic geometric codes.
Remark 15. In our exposition we used a single (but arbitrary) basis B for
Fnq as a vector space over Fq. Following [37] one could reformulate all the
above results in a more general setting that uses three bases U , V, and W.
This point of view is important when one considers affine variety codes [38],
but it does not improve the results for order domain codes. In [14] and [15],
the concept of OWB was relaxed giving new improved Feng-Rao bounds. All
the above results could be reformulated in this setting – but again – for order
domain codes the results stay unchanged.
5 One-point algebraic geometric codes
Given an algebraic function field F of transcendence degree one, let P1, . . . , Pn,
Q be distinct rational places. For f ∈ F write ρ(f) = −νQ(f), where νQ
11
is the valuation at Q, and denote by H(Q) the Weierstrass semigroup of Q.
That is, H(Q) = ρ
(
∪∞µ=0 L(µQ)
)
. In the following let {fλ | λ ∈ H(Q)} be
any fixed basis for R = ∪∞µ=0L(µQ) with ρ(fλ) = λ for all λ ∈ H(Q). Let
D = P1 + · · ·+ Pn and define
H∗(Q) = {µ | CL(D, µQ) 6= CL(D, (µ− 1)Q)}
= {γ1, . . . , γn} ( H(Q). (12)
Here, the enumeration is chosen such that γ1 < · · · < γn. Consider the map
ev : F → Fnq given by ev(f) = (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)). The set
{~b1 = ev(fγ1), . . . ,~bn = ev(fγn)} (13)
clearly is a basis for Fnq and by [1, Pro. 27] a pair (i, j) is OWB if ρ(fγi) +
ρ(fγj ) = ρ(fγl), i. e. γi+γj = γl, in which case of course ρ¯(~bi∗~bj) = l. From [1,
Pro. 28] we know that if δ ∈ H∗(Q) and α, β ∈ H(Q) satisfy α+ β = δ then
we have α, β ∈ H∗(Q). We therefore get the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Let {~b1, . . . ,~bn} be as above. For i ∈ J it holds that
{l ∈ J | γl − γi ∈ H(Q)} ⊆ Λi
where Λi is as in Definition 7.
Proposition 17. Let D ⊆ Fnq be a vector space of dimension m. There exist
unique numbers γi1 < · · · < γim in H
∗(Q) such that ρ¯(D\{~0}) = {i1, . . . , im}.
The support of D satisfies
#Supp(D) ≥ #
(
H∗(Q) ∩
(
∪ms=1 (γis +H(Q))
))
(14)
≥ n− γim +#{λ ∈ ∪
m−1
s=1 (γis +H(Q)) | λ /∈ γim +H(Q)}.(15)
Proof. By Lemma 16 the right side of (14) is lower than or equal to#∪ms=1Λis,
and (14) therefore follows from Proposition 8. Another way of writing the
right side of (14) is n−#
(
H∗(Q)\∪ms=1 (γis+H(Q))
)
. This number is greater
than or equal to
n−#
(
H(Q)\ ∪ms=1 (γis +H(Q))
)
= n−#
(
H(Q)\(γim +H(Q))
)
+# {λ ∈ ∪m−1s=1 (γis +H(Q)) | λ /∈ γim +H(Q)}.
From [22, Lem. 5.15] we know that for any numerical semigroup Γ and λ ∈ Γ,
one has λ = #
(
Γ\(λ+Γ)
)
. In particular #
(
H(Q)\(γim +H(Q))
)
= γim and
(15) follows.
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From (15) we can obtain a manageable bound on the RGHWs of one-point
algebraic geometric codes as we now explain. This bound can even be used
when one does not know H∗(Q). Given non-negative integers λ1 < · · · < λm
(note that we make no assumptions that λ1, . . . , λm ∈ H(Q)) let ij = λj−λm,
j = 1, . . . , m− 1 and observe that
#{λ ∈ ∪m−1s=1 (λi +H(Q) | λ /∈ λm +H(Q)}
= #{α ∈ ∪m−1s=1 (is +H(Q)) | α /∈ H(Q)} (16)
since λ is in the first set if and only if λ − λm is in the second set. The
function Z in the definition below shall help us estimate the last expression
in (15).
Definition 18. Consider a numerical semigroup Γ and a positive integer µ.
Define Z(Γ, µ, 1) = 0 and for 1 < m ≤ µ
Z(Γ, µ,m) = min
{
#{α ∈ ∪m−1s=1 (is + Γ) | α /∈ Γ} |
− µ+ 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im−1 ≤ −1
}
. (17)
We are now ready for the main result of the section.
Theorem 19. Let µ1, µ2 be positive integers with µ2 < µ1.
For m = 1, . . . , dim(CL(D, µ1Q))− dim(CL(D, µ2Q)) we have
Mm(CL(D, µ1Q), CL(D, µ2Q))
≥ min
{
#
(
H∗(Q) ∩
(
∪ms=1 (γis +H(Q))
))
| γi1, . . . , γim ∈ H
∗(Q), µ2 < γi1 < · · · < γit ≤ µ1
}
(18)
≥ min
{
n− γim +#{λ ∈ ∪
m−1
s=1 (γis +H(Q)) | λ /∈ γim +H(Q)}
| γi1, . . . , γim ∈ H
∗(Q), µ2 < γi1 < · · · < γit ≤ µ1
}
(19)
≥ n− µ1 + Z(H(Q), µ,m), (20)
where µ = µ1 − µ2.
Proof. Consider an m-dimensional vector space D ⊆ CL(D, µ1Q) with D ∩
CL(D, µ2Q) = {~0}. Let γi1 < · · · < γim be as described in Theorem 17.
By the definition of the codes we have γi1 , . . . , γim ∈ {µ2 + 1, . . . , µ1} (this
is the situation of Corollary 10). Consequently (18) and (19), respectively,
follow from (14) and (15), respectively. We have −µ1 ≤ −γim . Similarly,
by (16) Z(H(Q), µ,m) is smaller than or equal to the last term in (15).
These observations prove (20).
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Note that (20) may be strictly smaller than (19). Firstly, µ1 may not
belong to H∗(Q). Secondly, when applying the function Z(H(Q), µ,m) we
do not discard the numbers in {µ2 + 1, . . . , µ1 − 1} that are gaps of H(Q),
and least of all the numbers in the interval that are not present in H∗(Q).
The connection to the usual Goppa bound for primary codes is seen from the
expression in (20): letting m = 1 we get by Definition 18 Z(H(Q), µ,m) = 0
and the formula simplifies to the well-known bound on the minimum distance
d
(
CL(D, µ1Q)
)
≥ n− µ1.
For duals of one-point algebraic geometric codes we have a bound similar
to (18), but no bounds similar to (19) or (20).
Theorem 20. Let µ1, µ2 and m be as in Theorem 19. We have
Mm(C
⊥
L (D, µ2Q), C
⊥
L (D, µ1Q))
≥ min
{
#
(
H(Q) ∩
(
∪ms=1 (γis −H(Q))
))
| γi1, . . . , γim ∈ H
∗(Q), µ2 < γi1 < · · · < γim ≤ µ1
}
. (21)
6 RGHWs of Hermitian codes
In this section we apply the results of Section 5 to the case of Hermitian codes
[42, 40]. Our main result is that (20) is often tight. The Hermitian function
field over Fq2 (q a prime power) is given by the equation xq+1− yq− y and it
possesses exactly q3 + 1 rational places which we denote P1, . . . , Pq3, Q – the
last being the pole of x. The Weierstrass semigroup of Q, H(Q) = 〈ρ(x) =
q, ρ(y) = q + 1〉, has g = q(q − 1)/2 gaps and conductor c = q(q − 1). Let
D = P1 + · · ·+Pq3. In the following by a Hermitian code we mean a code of
the form CL(D, µQ). Clearly, this code is of length n = q3. As is well-known
the dual of a Hermitian code is a Hermitian code. This fact will be useful
when in a later section we consider ramp schemes based on Hermitian codes.
We start our investigation with a lemma that treats a slightly more general
class of semigroups than the semigroup 〈q, q + 1〉 relevant to us.
Lemma 21. Let a be an integer, a ≥ 2. Define Γ = 〈a, a+ 1〉. For integers
m,µ with 1 ≤ m ≤ µ ≤ a+ 1 it holds that
Z(Γ, µ,m) =
m−2∑
s=0
(a− s) = a(m− 1)− (m− 2)(m− 1)/2. (22)
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Proof. Recall that a positive integer λ is called a gap of Γ if λ /∈ Γ. All other
non-negative integers are called non-gaps. For the given semigroup Γ the
set of non-negative integers consists of one non-gap followed by a − 1 gaps,
then two non-gaps followed by a − 2 gaps and so on up to a − 1 non-gaps
followed by a− (a−1) = 1 gap. All the following numbers are non-gaps. We
denote the above maximal sequences of consecutive gaps G1, . . . , Ga−1 with
#Gv = a− v, v = 1, . . . , a− 1 (such sequences are called deserts in [34, Ex.
3]).
First assume 1 ≤ m ≤ µ ≤ a + 1. Let −µ ≤ i1 < . . . < im−1 ≤ −1. We have
#Gv ∩
(
∪m−1s=1 (is + Γ)
)
≥ min{#Gv, m− 1}
with equality when im−1 = −1, im−2 = −2, . . . , i1 = −(m− 1). Summing up
the contribution from all Gv accounts for
∑m−2
s=1 (a − s). The term in (22)
corresponding to s = 0, namely a, comes from considering the number of
negative integers in
∑m−1
s=1 (is + Γ). Thus we have established (22).
Recall from Theorem 19 that we have three bounds on the RGHW of
which (20) is the weakest. Using Lemma 21, for Hermitian codes of codi-
mension at most q + 1, (20) translates into the below closed formula expres-
sion (23). Surprisingly, this expression is often equal to the true value of the
RGHW.
Theorem 22. Consider the Hermitian curve xq+1 − yq − y over Fq2. Let
P1, . . . , Pn=q3, and Q be the rational places and D = P1 + · · · + Pn. Let
µ1, µ2 be non-negative integers with 1 ≤ µ1 − µ2 ≤ q + 1. For 1 ≤ m ≤
dim(CL(D, µ1Q))− dim(CL(D, µ2Q)) we have
Mm(CL(D, µ1Q), CL(D, µ2Q)) ≥ n− µ1 +
m−2∑
s=0
(q − s) (23)
= n− µ1 + q(m− 1)− (m− 2)(m− 1)/2.
If
c− 1 ≤ µ2 and µ1 < n− c. (24)
(recall that c = q(q−1)) then we have dim(CL(D, µ1Q))−dim(CL(D, µ2Q)) =
µ1 − µ2 and equality in (23).
Proof. Equation (23) is a consequence of the last part of Theorem 19 and the
first part of Lemma 21. The result concerning the dimensions is well-known.
That equality holds in (23) under condition (24) follows from Lemma 23
below.
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Lemma 23. Let µ1 and m be positive integers with m ≤ q + 1, µ1 < n − c
and c − 1 < µ1 − (m − 1). Then there exist m functions f0, . . . , fm−1 such
that
• fi ∈ L((µ1 − i)Q)\L((µ1 − (i+ 1))Q), i = 0, . . . , m− 1.
• The number of common zeros of f0, . . . , fm−1 is exactly µ1−
∑m−2
i=0 (q−
i).
Proof. As is well-known ∪∞µ=0L(µQ) is isomorphic to Fq2 [X, Y ]/I, where I =
〈Xq+1−Y q−Y 〉. The isomorphism is given by ϕ(x) = X+I and ϕ(y) = Y +I.
We call Xq+1−Y q−Y = N(X)−Tr(Y ) the Hermitian polynomial – N being
the norm and Tr the trace corresponding to the field extension Fq2/Fq. In
this description the rational places P1, . . . , Pq3 correspond to the affine points
of the Hermitian polynomial. We remind the reader of the following few facts
which play a crucial role in the below induction proofs:
• For any δ ∈ Fq2 we have N(δ),Tr(δ) ∈ Fq.
• For every ǫ ∈ Fq there exists exactly q different δ such that Tr(δ) = ǫ.
• There exist exactly q + 1 different δ such that N(δ) = 1.
We start by fixing some notation. Let {α1, . . . , αq} be the elements in Fq2
that map to 1 under Tr. Let {β1, . . . , βq2−(q+1)} be the elements that do not
map to 1 under N and {γ1, . . . , γq+1} the elements that do.
Write µ1 = iq + j(q + 1) with 0 ≤ j < q. First assume 1 ≤ m ≤ j + 1 and
that i < q2 − q. By induction on m (in this interval) one can show that the
set {F0, F1, . . . , Fm−1} where
F0 =
( i∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( j∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
, (25)
F1 =
( i∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)
(X − γ1)
( j−1∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
, . . . , (26)
Fm−1 =
( i∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)(m−1∏
s=1
(X − γs)
)( j−m+1∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
, (27)
has exactly iq+ j(q+1)−
∑m−2
s=0 (q− s) zeros in common with the Hermitian
polynomial Xq+1 − Y q − Y (we leave the technical details for the reader).
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Finally, assume j + 1 ≤ m ≤ j + q. By induction on m (in this interval) one
can show that the set {F0, F1, . . . , Fm−1} where
F0 =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q−j∏
s=1
(X − γs)
)( j∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
, (28)
F1 =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q−j+1∏
s=1
(X − γs)
)( j−1∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
, . . . , (29)
Fj =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q∏
s=1
(X − γs)
)
, (30)
Fj+1 =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q−1∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
,
Fj+2 =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q−2∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)
(X − γ1), . . . ,
Fm−1 =
( i−q+j∏
s=1
(X − βs)
)( q−m+j+1∏
s=1
(Y − αs)
)(m−j−2∏
s=1
(X − γs)
)
,
has exactly iq+ j(q+1)−
∑m
s=0(q− s) zeros in common with the Hermitian
polynomialXq+1−Y q−Y (again we leave the technical details for the reader).
For simplicity we covered the case m = j+1 and i < q2−q in both induction
proofs. Observe that the basis step m = j + 1 of the last induction proof
corresponds to the terms in (28), (29), (30) which are different from (25),
(26), (27) with m = j + 1.
For 1 ≤ m ≤ µ1 − µ2 ≤ q + 1 but with µ1 and µ2 not satisfying the
condition in (24) we can often derive much better estimates than (23).
For µ2 < c−1 it may happen that not all of the numbers µ1, µ1−1, . . . , µ1−
(m − 1) belong to H(Q), and so the worst case in the proof of Theorem 19
may not be realized. Hence, we should rather apply (19) or (18) (which in
this situation are equivalent).
For n−c ≤ µ1 it may happen thatH∗(Q)\(µ1+H(Q)) is strictly smaller than
H(Q)\(µ1+H(Q)) (this will happen if µ1 = iq+j(q+1), with q2−q ≤ i < q2
and 0 < j < q). In such a case #
(
H∗(Q) ∩ (µ1 + H(Q))
)
will be strictly
larger than n − µ1. Moreover, all the numbers µ1, µ1 − 1, . . . , µ1 − (m − 1)
need not belong to H∗(Q) (this may happen if µ1 ≥ n) and again the worst
case considered in the proof of Theorem 19 may not be realizable. In this
situation we should rather apply (18).
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We illustrate our observations with three examples. The first two are
concerned with µ2 < c− 1 and the last with n− c ≤ µ1.
Example 1. In this example we consider codes over Fq2 = F16. Hence,
q = 4, H(Q) = 〈4, 5〉 and n = 64. The first numbers of H∗(Q) (and H(Q))
are 0, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12. Hence, dimCL(D, 8Q) = 4, dimCL(D, 12Q) = 7. The-
orem 22 tells us that Mm(CL(D, 12Q), CL(D, 8Q)) is at least 52, 56 and 59,
for m equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Using (19) we now show that for
m = 2 and m = 3 the true values are at least 58 and 60, respectively. We
first concentrate on m = 2. Using the notation from Proposition 17 we must
investigate all γi1, γi2 ∈ {9, 10, 12} with γi1 < γi2, We have three different
choices of (γi1, γi2) to consider, namely (10, 12), (9, 12) and (9, 10). We first
observe that
12 +H(Q) = {12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, . . .}
10 +H(Q) = {10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, . . .}
9 +H(Q) = {9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, . . .}.
Note that if α ∈ H(Q)\(λ+H(Q)) for λ ∈ {9, 10, 12} then also α ∈ H∗(Q).
(γi1 , γi2) = (10, 12): We have
#(H∗(Q) ∩ (12 +H(Q)) = n− 12 = 52, (31)
#((10 +H(Q))\(12 +H(Q)) = 6.
Hence, we get the value 52 + 6 = 58.
(γi1 , γi2) = (9, 12): Combining (31) with
#((9 +H(Q))\(12 +H(Q)) = 6
again give us the value 52 + 6 = 58.
(γi1 , γi2) = (9, 10): We have
#(H∗(Q) ∩ (10 +H(Q)) = n− 10 = 54,
#((9 +H(Q))\(10 +H(Q)) = 4
producing the value 54 + 4 = 58.
The minimum of the above three values is 58 which is then our estimate
on M2(CL(D, 12Q), CL(D, 8Q)).
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Finally consider m = 3. There is only one choice of (γi1 , γi2, γi3) namely
(9, 10, 12). By inspection there are exactly 8 numbers that are in either
9 + H(Q) or 10 + H(Q) but not in 12 + H(Q). Hence, our estimate on
M3(CL(D, 12Q), CL(D, 8Q)) becomes n− 12 + 8 = 60.
Example 2. This is a continuation of Example 1. The dimension of CL(D, 10Q)
and CL(D, 5Q) are 6 and 3, respectively. Theorem 22 tells us that
Mm(CL(D, 10Q), CL(D, 5Q)) is at least n − 10 = 54, n − 10 + 4 = 58 and
n− 10+4+3 = 61, for m equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The possible val-
ues of γis to consider are 8, 9, 10, which constitute a sequence without gaps.
Hence, according to our discussion prior to Example 1 in this case we cannot
improve upon Theorem 19.
Example 3. This is a continuation of Example 1 and 2. The last numbers
of H∗(Q) are {65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 79}. Hence, dim(CL(D, 69Q)) =
64 − 5 = 59 and dim(CL(D, 65Q)) = 64 − 8 = 56. Theorem 22 gives no
information on the first two RGHWs and only tells us that the third relative
weight is larger than or equal to 2. This, however, is useless information as
any space D of dimension 3 has a support of size at least 3. As we will now
demonstrate (18) guarantees that the three RGHWs are at least 3, 6, and 8,
respectively. We first observe that
H∗(Q) ∩ (69 +H(Q)) = {69, 74, 79}
H∗(Q) ∩ (67 +H(Q)) = {67, 71, 75, 79}
H∗(Q) ∩ (66 +H(Q)) = {66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 79}.
The smallest set is of size 3 and we get M1(CL(D, 69Q), CL(D, 65Q)) = 3.
The smallest union of two sets is the union of the first two. This union is of
size 6 giving us M2(CL(D, 69Q), CL(D, 65Q)) ≥ 6.
The union of all three sets is of size 8. Hence,M3(CL(D, 69Q), CL(D, 65Q)) ≥
8.
6.1 A comparison between RGHW and GHW
In [33] and [3], respectively, Munuera & Ramirez and Barbero & Munuera
determined the GHWs of any Hermitian code. To state all their results is
too extensive. However, already from their master theorem [33, Prop. 12],
[3, Prop. 2.3], one can deduce that the RGHWs are often much larger than
the corresponding GHWs.
Definition 24. Let ev : ∪∞µ=0CL(D, µQ) → F
n
q be the map ev(f) = (f(P1),
. . . , f(Pn)). The abundance α(µ) is the dimension of ker ev when ev is re-
stricted to CL(D, µQ).
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The following is the master theorem from [33, 3]. Here, and throughout the
rest of this section, we use the notation H(Q) = {ρ1, ρ2, . . .} with ρi < ρj for
i < j.
Theorem 25. For m = 1, . . . , dim(CL(D, µQ))
dm(CL(D, µQ)) ≥ n− µ+ ρm + α(µ). (32)
Equality holds under the following conditions:
1. µ ∈ H∗(Q)
2. n − µ + ρm+α(µ) ∈ H(Q), in which case we write n − µ + ρm+α(µ) =
iq + j(q + 1), where i, j are non-negative integers with j < q.
3. i ≤ q2 − q − 1 or j = 0.
Observe that Theorem 25 and Theorem 22, respectively, produce simi-
lar estimates for the minimum distance and the relative minimum distance.
Similarly for the second GHW and the second RGHW. From the last part of
Theorem 22 we conclude that for m = 1, 2, whenever m ≤ µ1 − µ2 ≤ q + 1,
c − 1 ≤ µ2 and µ1 < n − c holds, then Mm(CL(D, µ1Q), CL(D, µ2Q)) =
dm(CL(D, µ1Q)) (recall that c is the conductor). As shall be demonstrated
in the following, for higher values of m, Mm(CL(D, µ1Q), CL(D, µ2Q)) is of-
ten much larger than dm(CL(D, µ1Q)).
Proposition 26. For q > 2, 1 ≤ m ≤ q + 1 and 2q2 − q ≤ µ ≤ n − c we
have dm(CL(D, µQ)) = n− µ+ ρm.
Proof. It is well-known [42] that for µ ≤ q3 − 1 we have α(µ) = 0. There-
fore (32) simplifies to dm(CL(D, µQ)) ≥ n − µ + ρm under the conditions
of the proposition. To prove the proposition it suffices to demonstrate the
conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Theorem 25. As is well-known µ ∈ H∗(Q) when
c ≤ µ < n. However, c < 2q2 − q and therefore condition 1 follows. To
see that condition 2 is satisfied note that by assumption c ≤ n − µ and so
n− µ+ ρm+α(µ) ≥ c. To demonstrate condition 3 it suffices to show
n− µ+ ρm ≤ q
3 − q2. (33)
Observe that ρm ≤ q(q − 1) which holds because of the assumption that
m ≤ q + 1 and q > 2 and because the number of gaps in H(Q) equals
q(q−1)/2. As a consequence the assumption 2q2−q ≤ µ implies q2+ρm ≤ µ
from which we derive (33).
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m 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Diff(m,4) 2 1 1
Diff(m,5) 3 2 3 3
Diff(m,7) 5 4 7 9 6 6
Diff(m,8) 6 5 9 12 9 10 10
Diff(m,16) 14 13 25 36 33 42 50 57
m 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Diff(m,16) 51 56 60 63 65 55 55
Table 1: Diff(m, q) is the value of (34).
Proposition 27. Consider the field Fq2, with q > 2. Let 3 ≤ µ˜ ≤ q + 1
be fixed. For m = 3, . . . , µ˜ there are at least q3 − 3q2 + 1 different codes
CL(D, µQ) for which dm(CL(D, µQ)) = n − µ + ρm and simultaneously
Mm(CL(D, µQ), CL(D, (µ − µ˜)Q)) = n − µ +
∑m−2
i=0 (q − i) hold. For these
codes we have
Mm(CL(D, µQ), CL(D, (µ− µ˜)Q))− dm(CL(D, µQ))
=
(m−2∑
s=0
(q − s)
)
− ρm > 0. (34)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 25, Theorem 22 and a study of H(Q).
Note that if for fixed µ˜ we divide the number of different codes CL(D, µQ)
for which (34) holds by the number of different codes, which is q3, then we
get the ratio R(q) ≥ (q3 − 3q2 + 1)/q3 ≥ 1 − 3/q. This ratio approaches 1
as q approaches infinity. For q = 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 32, respectively, R(q) is
at least 0.25, 0.4, 0.57, 0.62, 0.66, 0.81, and 0.9, respectively. In Table 1 for
different values of m and q we list the difference between the parameters as
expressed in (34).
7 Ramp schemes based on Hermitian codes
In this section we consider ramp secret sharing schemes D1/D2 where D1 =
C⊥2 , D2 = C
⊥
1 , and C2 ( C1 are Hermitian codes over Fq2, with dim(C1) −
dim(C2) = µ˜. Recall from Theorem 3 in Section 2 that tm+1 = Mm(C1, C2),
m = 1, . . . , µ˜ is the size of the smallest group that can reveal m q2-bits of
information. Also recall that rm = n −Mµ˜−m+1(D1, D2) + 1 is the smallest
number such that any group of this size can reveal m q2-bits of information.
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From Section 6 we know how to determine/estimate Mm(C1, C2). Now [42,
Th. 1] tells us that for µ ∈ H∗(Q) we have CL(D, µQ)⊥ = CL(D, (n +
c − 2 − µ)Q). To establish information on rm we therefore need not apply
Theorem 20 (the theorem for duals of one-point algebraic geometric codes),
but can instead use the already established information on the RGHW of
C2 ⊆ C1. From Theorem 22 we get the following result:
Theorem 28. Let µ, µ˜ be positive integers satisfying
µ˜ ≤ q + 1, c− 1 + µ˜ ≤ µ ≤ n− 1. (35)
Consider the ramp secret sharing scheme D1/D2 = C
⊥
2 /C
⊥
1 where C1 =
CL(D, µQ) and C2 = CL(D, (µ − µ˜)Q). The codimension (and thereby the
length of the secret) equals µ˜. Furthermore for m = 1, . . . , µ˜ it holds that
tm ≥ n− µ+
m−2∑
s=0
(q − s)− 1, (36)
rm ≤ n− µ+ c + µ˜− 1−
µ˜−m−1∑
s=0
(q − s). (37)
Equality holds simultaneously in (36) and (37) when the second condition
in (35) is replaced with
2c− 2 + µ˜ < µ < n− c. (38)
Example 4. In this example we consider schemes over F64. That is, q = 8
and the number of participants is n = 512. The assumption (35) for (36)
and (37) to hold is µ˜ ≤ 9, 55 + µ˜ ≤ µ ≤ 511, the latter corresponding
to 1 ≤ n − µ ≤ 457 − µ˜. By (38) equality holds simultaneously in (36)
and (37) when 56 < n − µ < 402 − µ˜ holds. In Table 2 we list for µ˜ =
q + 1 the values of G1(m, q) =
∑m−2
s=0 (q − s) (which is our lower bound on
(tm + 1) − (n − µ)) and G2(m, µ˜, q) = c + µ˜ − 1 −
∑µ˜−m−1
s=0 (q − s) (which
is our upper bound on rm − (n − µ)). Note that G1(m, q) = Z(H(Q), µ,m)
(Lemma 21). For the considered choice of µ˜ the secret is of size equal to 9
q2-bits. One can get much information from Table 2. Assume for instance
n − µ = 130. Then the smallest group that can derive some information is
of size 130+ 0 = 130, hence t1 = 129. The smallest group size for which any
group can derive some information is r1 = 130 + 28 = 158. Groups of size
158 on the other hand can never obtain more than 5 q2-bits of information as
G1(5, 8) ≤ 158− 130 < G1(6, 8). Some group of size t3 +1 = 130+ 15 = 145
can derive at least 3 q2-bits of information, however, r3 = 130 + 31 = 161
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
G1(m, 8) 0 8 15 21 26 30 33 35 36
G2(m, 9, 8) 28 29 31 34 38 43 49 56 64
Table 2: Parameters of the ramp schemes in Example 4.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
G1(m, 16) 0 16 31 45 58 70 81 91
G2(m, 16, 16) 120 122 125 129 134 140 147 155
m 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
G1(m, 16) 100 108 115 121 126 130 133 135
G2(m, 16, 16) 164 174 185 197 210 224 239 255
Table 3: Parameters of the ramp schemes in Example 5.
is the smallest group size guaranteed to reveal 3 q2-bits of information. Any
group of size r9 = 130+64 = 194 can reveal the entire secret. Some group of
size t9+1 = 130+36 = 166 can reveal the entire secret whereas other groups
of size 166 can reveal no more than 4 q2-bits of information.
Example 5. In this example we consider schemes over F256 . That is, q = 16
and the number of participants is n = 4096. Assumption (35) is 1 ≤ n−µ <
3857− µ˜ and by (38) equality holds in (36) and (37) simultaneously if
240 < n− µ < 3618− µ˜ (39)
In Table 3 we list values of G1(m, 16) and G2(m, 16, 16) where the functions
G1 and G2 are as in Example 4. Assuming (39), then from the table we get
the following information: Some groups of size t1 + 1 = n − µ may reveal
1 q2-bit of information whereas other groups of size n − µ + 119 cannot as
r1 = n−µ+120. Some group of size t11+1 = n−µ+115 can reveal 11 q
2-bits
of information whereas some group of the same size can not reveal anything.
Any group of size n − µ + 135 can for sure reveal 5 q2-bits of information
and some group of the same size can reveal everything. Any group of size
r16 = n− µ+ 255 can reveal the entire secret.
Remark 29. Assume that (35) holds and let m ≤ µ˜. The difference between
the smallest size for which any group can reveal m q2-bits of information and
the smallest size for which some group can reveal m q2-bits of information
23
equals (n−Mµ˜+1−m(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) + 1)−Mm(C1, C2) which is at most
c+ µ˜− 1−
µ˜−m−1∑
s=0
(q − s)−
m−2∑
s=0
(q − s) (40)
(with equality if 2c− 2 + µ˜ < µ < n− c). The maximum of (40) is attained
at m = 1 and m = µ˜. The corresponding “worst-case” difference equals
c+ µ˜− 1− µ˜−1
2
(2q− µ˜+2). This number is highest possible when µ˜ = q and
µ˜ = q + 1, in which case it equals the genus g = (q2 − q)/2.
We conclude the section with an example in which we show how to im-
prove upon (36) and (37) when the condition (38) is not satisfied.
Example 6. In this example we consider schemes over F16. That is, q = 4
and the number of participants is n = 64. We consider secrets of length 3.
Hence, we require that
dim(C1 = CL(D, µ1Q))− dim(C2 = CL(D, µ2Q)) = 3.
We have
H∗(Q) = {0, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, · · · , 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75}
and therefore without loss of generality the possible choices of (µ1, µ2) are
{(µ
(1)
1 , µ
(1)
2 ), . . . , (µ
(62)
1 , µ
(62)
2 )}
= {(5,−1), (8, 0), (9, 4), (10, 5), (12, 8), (13, 9), (14, 10), (15, 12),
. . . , (63, 60), (65, 61), (66, 62), (67, 63), (70, 65), (71, 66), (75, 67)},
where for (5,−1) we mean that C2 equals {~0}. In the following we calculate
tm = Mm(CL(D, µ1Q), CL(D, µ2Q))− 1,
rm = n−Mµ2−µ1−m+1(CL(D, (n+ c− 2− µ2)Q), CL(D, (n− c+ 2− µ1)Q)) + 1
= n−Mµ2−µ1−m+1(CL(D, (74− µ2)Q), CL(D, (74− µ1)Q)) + 1,
m = 1, 2, 3, for all the above choices of (µ1, µ2).
Recall from the discussion prior to Example 1 in Section 6 that for some
choices of (µ1, µ2) we may achieve better estimates on the RGHW than (23).
This is done by applying the method of Example 1 and Example 3 which cor-
responds to (19) and (18), respectively. Specifically for µ1 = 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13
we do not have
{µ1, µ1 − 1, µ1 − 2} ⊆ H
∗(Q) (41)
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and to calculate tm we therefore apply the method of Example 1. By inspec-
tion, for µ1 = 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75 we have that
H∗(Q)\(µ1+H(Q)) is strictly smaller than H(Q)\(µ1+H(Q)) and also for
some of these values, (41) does not hold either. Hence, we apply the method
of Example 3. In conclusion the values of µ1 for which we can potentially
obtain improved information on tm are
S1 = {µ
(1)
1 , µ
(2)
1 , . . . , µ
(6)
1 , µ
(46)
1 , µ
(50)
1 , µ
(51)
1 , µ
(54)
1 , µ
(55)
1 , . . . , µ
(62)
1 } (42)
= {5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75}.
We next discuss rm. Here, a little care is needed in the analysis: as an
example for (µ1, µ2) = (µ
(4)
1 , µ
(4)
2 ) = (10, 5) we have C
⊥
2 = CL(D, (74 −
µ2)Q) = CL(D, 69Q), but this code is the same as CL(D, 67Q) because 68 and
69 do not belong to H∗(Q). This phenomenon corresponds to the fact that
actually CL(D, µ
(s)
2 Q)
⊥ = CL(D, µ
(63−s)
1 Q), s = 1, . . . , 62. Hence, from (42)
we see that the values of µ1 for which we can potentially derive improved
information regarding rm are
S2 = {µ
(63−1)
1 , . . . , µ
(63−6)
1 , µ
(63−46)
1 , µ
(63−50)
1 , µ
(63−51)
1 , µ
(63−54)
1 , . . . , µ
(63−62)
1 }
= {5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75}.
Applying a mixture of the method from Example 1 and Example 3 plus (23)
we derive for µ1 ∈ S1 ∪ S2 the information given in Table 4.
For the remaining values of µ1, that is for
µ1 ∈ {5, 8, 9, 10, 12, . . . , 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75}\(S1 ∪ S2)
= {17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, . . . , 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60}
we have µ2 = µ1 − 3, and the best bounds (sometimes tight) are obtained
from (23). They are: [t1 ≥ n−µ1−1, r1 ≤ n−µ1+7], [t2 ≥ n−µ1+3, r2 ≤
n− µ1 + 10] and [t3 ≥ n− µ1 + 6, r3 ≤ n− µ1 + 14].
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